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1.Knowledge Representation 
1.1 Introduction 
Understanding language requires a large amount of 
knowledge: knowledge about language, knowledge about 
communication, and knowledge about the world. 
Representing knowledge in a precise, computer-usable 
form presents a multitude of difficult problems and 
knowledge-representation formalisms are of central 
importance to all natural language understanding 
systems. 
At the present, there is no acknowledged best way 
to represent knowledge and it is unlikely that a single 
representation system can be expected to expand all the 
knowledge domains. 
1.2 Declarative VS Procedural Knowledge Representation 
There are two kinds of knowledge representation: 
declarative and procedural. Declarative representations 
stress the static aspects of knowledge--facts about 
objects, events and their relations and about the states 
of the world. Procedural representations stress how 
knowledge can be used--how to find relevant facts, make 
inferences, and so on. 
1.3 Linguistic VS Non-Linguistic Knowledge 
The knowledge that is brought to bear in 
understanding language is of two kinds: linguistic and 
non-linguistic. However, there is not a clear division 
between these two kinds of knowledge. In general, 
linguistic knowledge consists of the levels of structure 
that are rather autonomous: phonology, morphology, and 
syntax. Non-linguistic knowledge comprises the 
knowledge about the world that the hearer and speaker 
share: in other words, the world views or the cognitive 
structure of the speaker and hearer which includes their 
beliefs about the world and about one another's beliefs, 
intentions, desires, and so on. 
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1.4 Montague Semantics as a Knowledge Representation 
Formalism 
Montague semantics has two main attractions for 
computational linguistics: (i) it is a well-specified 
semantic theory, and (ii) it is rigorously defined and 
algorithmic in nature. Montague semantics has been 
adopted as a linguistic model in many parsing programs 
and its intensional logic has also been used as an 
interlingua in machine translation systems. However, 
the stronger appeal of Montague semantics lies in the 
model-theoretic semantics of intensional logic which 
provides a formalism for representing knowledge, 
linguistic as well as non-linguistic, and an algorithm 
for interpretation--an algorithm for mapping linguistic 
entities to real world situation. 
2. Montague Semantics 
2.1 Introduction 
Montague semantics is a truth-conditional semantics, a 
model-theoretic semantics, as well as a possible world 
semantics. It is truth conditional because a 
specification of the conditions under which a given 
sentence would be true is considered an essential part 
of the semantic interpretation of any sentence. It is 
model theoretic because it includes relativized truth--
truth under an interpretation or truth relative to a 
model. It is possible world semantics because the 
conditions under which a sentence would be true is not 
limited to conditions in the actual world. 
The goal of the Montague system is to define a truth 
definition. This definition involves constructing two 
languages: a natural language under analysis referred 
to as the object language, and an artificial language 
referred to as the logic. The logic referred to here is 
tensed intensional logic (IL). 
The logic, which is a language with its own syntax 
and semantics, constitutes the semantics of the object 
language; the semantics of the object language is done 
through the semantics of the logic. The object language 
and the logic are linked together by a set of 
translation rules. 
A central working premise of the Montague theory is 
that for any language the syntactic rules that 
determines how a sentence is built out of smaller 
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syntactic parts should correspond one to one with the 
semantic rules that tell how the meaning of a sentence 
results from the combination of the meaning of its 
parts. Since the semantics of the object language is 
done indirectly through the logic, the premise is 
reflected in the correspondence between the syntactic 
rules of the object language and the translation rules 
and the correspondence between the syntactic categories 
of the object language and the types of the logic. Types 
are syntactic categories of the logic. 
2.2 The Interpretation 
The interpretation involves the construction of an 
abstract mathematical model. The model specifies things 
in the world(s) making up the semantic value of 
expressions in a language and, with respect to this 
assumed ontology, specifies interpretations of units in 
the language. In Montague semantics, set-theoretic 
constructions, such as sets and functions, are employed 
as the objects in a model that are assigned as semantic 
values of expressions. 
The model under which denotations and semantic 
rules are also defined is a quintuple <A,W,I,<,F> such 
that 
A is a set of entities 
W is a set of possible worlds 
I is a set of moment of time 
< is a linear ordering having 
as its domain such that i < i' 
= i is earlier than i' 
F is a function having as its domain the set of 
all constants. 
3. The Thai Fragment 
3.1 Introduction 
A small fragment of Thai is built in the Montague 
framework. The portion of Thai included in the fragment 
is simple sentences and two time expressions /khaay/ and 
/lrerew/. A universe of discourse is also provided as a 
basis for interpretation. Presented here are the 
semantic rules of intensional logic containing the truth 
conditions of /khaay/ and /lrerew/, a portion of the 
universe of discourse, and examples to demonstrate how 
semantic rules access the real-world knowledge and 
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assign truth values to sentences. For the complete 
fragment, the complete universe of discourse, and more 
examples, see Chiraporn(1988). 
3.2 The Expressions of Time in Thai 
Time is expressed lexically in Thai by temporal 
adverbials, time-location markers, and aspect markers. 
Thai verbs undergo no morphological change and, when 
unmarked (occurring by themselves),are considered 
neutral as far as time is concerned. 
3 . 3 /khaay I and /lrerew I 
/khaay/ is an experiential aspect marker as well as 
a past-time-location marker. /lrerew/ is a perfect aspect 
marker and also implicates past time. Two examples 
below illustrate the use of /khaay/ and /lrerew/. 
khaw khaay pay aoklit 
he go England 
'He has been to England.' 
khaw pay aoklit lrerew 
he go England 
'He has gone to England.' 
The meanings of /khaay/ and /lrerew/ can be 
distinguished truth conditionally and their truth 
conditions are as follows: 
khaay a at time p is true if and only if 
a is true at time t such that t < p and 
a is not true at p 
lrerew a at time p is true if and only if 
a is not true 'at time t such that t < p 
and e is true at p 
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These truth conditions which are linguistic 
knowledge are represented in the semantic rules of 
intensional logic shown below. 
(1) • If Cl E MEt, 
then khaay au, w, i = 1, 
iff cxU,w,i' = 1 such that 
i ' < i and au• w, i = o 
{2) • If Cl E MEt, 
then lrerew cxu,w,i = 1, 
iff cxU,w,i' = 0 such that 
i' < i and 
au,w,i = 1 
4. The Real-World Knowledge Representation and the 
Interpretation 
4.1 The Real-World Knowledge Representation 
The universe of discourse is represented within the 
same model as the semantic rules in the form of set-
theoretic constructions: sets and functions. The 
following function F(~ron') is a function from the world-
time indices to the function from entities to truth 
values. The function represents the non-linguistic 
knowledge--the truth values of sentences with unmarked 
verb Iron/ 'hot' at different world-time indices. 
CAY 
<World 1, Time 1 > NAAM 1 
AA-KAAD 
CAY 
<World 1, Time 2 > NAAM 
AA-KAAD 
F c~ron I) CAY 
<World 2, Time 1 > NAAM 
AA-KAAD 
CAY 
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4.2 The Interpretation 
By specifying an ordered pair <w,i>, an extension 
of ron' can be extracted from the intension in 4.1. If 
the ordered pair is <World 2, Time 2>, the following 




By specifying an argument to the above function, a truth 
value can be derived. If the argument is NAAM 'water', 
the truth value is 1. If the argument is CAY 'mind', 
the truth value is 0. 
5.Conclusion 
A fragment of Thai is built in the Montague 
framework to demonstrate its potential as a knowledge 
representation system. The syntactic knowledge of Thai, 
namely the syntactic categories and syntactic rules, are 
represented in the syntax of the framework. The 
semantic knowledge of Thai, namely the truth conditions 
for sentences with unmarked and sentences containing 
/khaay/ and /lrerew/, are represented in the semantic rules 
of intensional logic. The non-linguistic knowledge, 
namely the truth values of sentences with unmarked verbs 
at different world-time indices (their intension), are 
represented as sets and functions in the model under 
which the semantic rules of intensional logic and the 
possible denotations are defined. 
Since the semantic rules, the possible denotations 
and the non-linguistic knowledge are defined and 
represented under the same model, the model-theoretic 
semantics of intensional logic constitutes a procedural 
knowledge representation system within which knowledge--
linguistic as well as non-linguistic--can be stored and 
manipulated to provide interpretation. 
However, the interpretation derived is by no means 
complete. The system understands that a certain 
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phenomenon is true or not true for a certain entity at a 
certain point of time and in a certain world, but it 
does not know what the entity is and what the phenomenon 
is. The issue of representation of the meaning of a 
lexical item needs to be addressed if the goal of the 
system is to enable the computer to understand language 
the way a human understands it. 
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